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Abstract
We study the classical free-rider problem in public goods provision
in a large economy with uncertainty about the average valuation of the
public good. Individual preferences over public goods are shaped by a
skill and a taste parameter. We use a mechanism design approach to
solve for the optimal utilitarian provision rule. The relevant incentive
constraints for information aggregation ensure that individuals behave
as if they were engaging in informative voting over the level of public
good provision. It is shown that the use of information by an optimal
provision rule is inversely related to the polarization of preferences
which results from the properties of the skill distribution.
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1 Introduction
We study a problem of optimal public good provision in a large economy in
which individuals have private information on their valuation of the public
good. Moreover, there is uncertainty about the average valuation of the of
public good among individuals in the economy.
Private information on public goods preferences gives rise to the classical
free-rider problem in public good provision. For economies with quasi-linear
preferences, it is a well-known result that the tension between efficiency and
incentive compatibility disappears as the number of individuals goes to in-
finity. This implies that, in an economy with infinitely many individuals,
the first-best surplus-maximizing allocation can be implemented even if in-
dividuals have private information on their public goods preferences.1
In this paper, we question this result along the following line. First, with an
infinite number of individuals, the underlying revelation game suffers from
multiple equilibria. Second, selecting the truthful equilibrium, is implausible
if confronted with considerations of tax incidence. Finally, we introduce a
condition which is sufficient to avoid these outcomes. It is borrowed from
the literature one voting mechanisms and interpreted as a requirement of
informative voting. The main part of the paper is a characterization of the
optimal rule for public good provision which satisfies this property.
Mechanism Design in a large economy and tax incidence
To illustrate the first point, recall that, in a finite economy with N individu-
als, incentive compatibility requires that individual contributions to the cost
of public good provision are commensurate to the individual’s impact on the
quantity decision. Otherwise individuals would not be willing to reveal their
characteristics. In the limit case as N →∞, no single individual has a direct
impact on public good provision. This implies that equal cost sharing is the
only admissible scheme of public goods finance. As a consequence, there are
multiple equilibria: all individuals pay equally for the public good and no
single preference announcement has an effect on the chosen quantity, hence
individuals are willing to make any conceivable announcement.
Given that the cost of public good provision has to be shared equally among
individuals, we investigate how the well-being of individuals is affected by
public good provision under this scheme of public goods finance (tax in-
cidence). In particular, we use a simple model to show that the truthful
equilibrium may have implausible consequences: individuals are assumed to
1It is a property of the Clarke-Groves mechanism, named after Clarke (1971) and
Groves (1973), that a revelation of preferences is a dominant action for each individual
and, moreover, that ex post budget balance is achieved almost surely as the number of
individuals goes to infinity. If one uses the weaker solution concept of Bayes-Nash equilib-
rium then the first-best allocation is implementable even in a finite economy, d’Aspremont
and Ge´rard-Varet (1979).
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affect the decision on public good provision in a way that runs counter to
their own interests if public goods are financed via equal cost sharing.
To explain this point, a sketch of our model is helpful. Individuals possess
private information on their effective valuation of the public good. The ef-
fective valuation is shaped by a taste parameter and a skill parameter. The
taste parameter either takes a high or a low value. The skill parameter is
drawn from a compact interval. It affects an individual’s valuation of the
public good because, under equal cost sharing, a less skilled individual suf-
fers from a larger utility loss if forced to contribute to the cost of public good
provision. Uncertainty about the distribution of public goods preferences –
equivalently, about the state of the economy – arises because the population
share of individuals with a high taste parameter is a random variable. Under
the requirement of equal cost sharing, the optimal utilitarian rule for public
good provision is a modified version of the Samuelson rule which equates, in
every state of the economy, the effective utilitarian valuation of the public
good and the marginal cost of public good provision.
Suppose now that public goods are provided according to this rule and con-
sider an individual with a high taste parameter but a very low skill level
and, for the sake of concreteness, suppose this individual expects the state
of the economy to be such that his own effective valuation of the public
good is smaller than the effective utilitarian valuation. Consequently, this
individual expects the level of the public good to be too large. If he chooses
his taste announcement based on his preferred quantity decision he should
announce a low taste realization. However, if all individuals with a low skill
level refuse to reveal a high taste parameter, then the population share of in-
dividuals with a high taste parameter is biased downwards. But this implies
that public goods cannot be provided according to the modified Samuelson
rule, which requires the state of the economy to be known.
More generally, these considerations demonstrate that the Samuelson rule
rests on the assumption that individuals reveal their taste parameter even
though it would be in their interest to support a different outcome.
The requirement of informative voting (IV )
To deal with this issue we adopt the following approach: the revelation
game is reinterpreted as a voting decision. More specifically, we interpret
the announcement of a high (low) taste parameter as a vote in favor of a
high (low) level of public good provision. Moreover, we assume that voting
behavior is rational in the sense that an individual announces a high (low)
taste parameter only if, under equal cost sharing, she prefers a rather high
(low) level of the public good to be provided.
The assumption that individuals vote in favor of a high (small) provision
level only if this is their preferred outcome translates into an additional
constraint for the possibility to acquire information on the state of the econ-
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omy. The population share of individuals with a high taste parameter can
be inferred from the distribution of votes only if the public good is indeed
provided in such a way that all individuals with a high taste parameter
prefer a large provision level over a small level and all individuals with a
low taste parameter prefer a small level over a large level. We call these
constraints the informative voting (IV) constraints.2
We characterize the optimal utilitarian provision rule which satisfies these
IV constraints. The main result is that the use of information by an optimal
provision rule is inversely related to a specific measure for the polarization
of effective valuations of the public good in the economy.3 To construct this
measure, the economy is divided into two groups: the group of individu-
als with a high taste parameter and the group with a low taste parameter.
Skill heterogeneity implies that there is within-group polarization of effective
valuations for the public good; e.g. an individual with low skills and a high
taste parameter has a small effective valuation relative to an individual with
high skills and a high taste parameter.
As soon as there is some degree of within-group polarization, an optimal
provision rule exhibits pooling ; i.e. the same provision level is chosen for a
whole range of possible states of the economy. In an extreme case of po-
larization, one finds that an optimal provision rule under IV constraints is
such that the same quantity of the public good has to be chosen in every
state of the economy. In this sense, an optimal allocation makes no use of
information.
Sampling as a foundation for IV
There exists no axiomatic foundation for the consideration of informative
voting constraints. They are introduced into the analysis based on an anal-
ogy between voting schemes and the revelation game we started out with.
Hence, they are different in status to the requirement of incentive compati-
bility, which is a necessary condition for the “implementability” of a scheme
of public good provision if individuals have private information on their skill
level and their taste parameter. By contrast, the IV constraints are suffi-
cient conditions which guarantee that the use of information on individual
preferences is in line with the views of these individuals on the desirability
of public good provision, given that the payment scheme prescribes equal
cost sharing.
With respect to this concern, the IV constraint are not unique; that is, one
could imagine alternative sufficient conditions which serve the same pur-
2These constraints resemble the notion of informative voting which is used in the field
of political economics, see e.g. Austen-Smith and Banks (1996).
3These observations are similar in spirit to classical results from the signalling litera-
ture. See e.g. Crawford and Sobel (1982), Schultz (1996), Grossman and Helpman (2001,
Ch. 4).
3
pose. The reason for focussing on this specific set of constraints is that they
can be given a reasonable institutional interpretation: they determine the
set of admissible rules of public good provision given that individuals vote
over the level of public good provision and thereby take into account how
the scheme of public goods finance affects the utility they derive from the
public good.
To make this more precise, we finally study sampling mechanisms. A fi-
nite subset of N randomly drawn individuals is asked to report their taste
parameters. Based on these taste announcements, the mechanism designer
estimates the effective utilitarian valuation of the public good and decides
on public good provision. Finally, the cost of provision is shared equally
among all individuals in the economy. We investigate the properties of an
optimal mechanism as the sample size N grows and individual influence on
the level of public good provision disappears. We show that as N →∞ the
optimal provision rule under sampling converges to the optimal provision
rule in the original mechanism design problem under IV constraints.4
The crucial assumption for our study of provision rules based on sampling
is that the payment scheme treats sampled individuals not differently than
individuals who possess the same characteristics but have not been in the
sample. From a general mechanism design perspective, this clearly involves
a loss of generality. There certainly exist welfare superior allocation mech-
anisms that do not share this property but force sampled individuals to
internalize the consequences of their announcements for the whole econ-
omy.5
Our convergence result establishes that the role of the IV constraints really
is to shift the focus to considerations of tax incidence. We treat equal cost
sharing as given. In particular, this implies that an individual’s contribution
to the cost of public good provision does not depend on the probability of
being pivotal for the decision on public good provision. Consequently, only
the scheme of taxation shapes individual preferences on public good pro-
vision. Given these preferences, we then need to structure incentives such
that information on the distribution of taste parameters becomes available
for the decision on public good provision.
4As a corollary of this analysis, we show that the optimal provision rule under IV
constraints provides an upper bound to the welfare levels which are achievable under
sampling, for any finite sample size N . Put differently, we show that an optimal sample
size does not exist. This observation is interpreted as a version of the famous Condorcet
Jury Theorem. A discussion of this theorem and of related results can be found in Piketty
(1999).
5As a consequence our approach differs from the sampling mechanisms analyzed by
Green and Laffont (1979, Ch.12) and Gary-Bobo and Jaaidane (2000). While these au-
thors study also allocation problems using only a subset of individuals for information
aggregation, they assume that contributions to the cost of public good provision may
differ for individuals within the sample and those who are not in the sample.
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Relationship to the theory of optimal income taxation
The initial motivation of this paper was to study more generally, optimal
rules for income taxation and public good provision in an economy where in-
dividuals have differing levels of ability and differing tastes for public goods.6
Even though this paper focusses on the conceptual issues that arise in a large
economy with private information on public goods preferences, it still pro-
vides a link between these two branches of the literature. It characterizes
the optimal rule for public good provision in the following environment:
Individuals derive utility from a public good, a private consumption good
and leisure. Moreover, the utility function is additively separable and quasi-
linear in leisure.7 The final allocation is determined sequentially. First, the
level of public good provision is determined. This generates a revenue re-
quirement in the public sector budget constraint. Second, the income tax
schedule is chosen optimally, subject to this predetermined revenue require-
ment.
The optimal provision for public goods rule derived in section 3 of this pa-
per is also optimal in this extended model under the assumption that, once
the level of public good provision is fixed, tax authorities choose an optimal
non-linear income tax in order to finance these expenditures.8
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we de-
rive the mechanism design problem under IV constraints. In Section 3 the
solution to this problem is characterized. Section 4 contains the discussion
of sampling mechanisms and the derivation of the Condorcet Jury Theorem.
The last section contains concluding remarks. All proofs can be found in
the appendix.
6Heterogeneity with respect to earning abilities is underlying the equity-efficiency trade-
off studied in the theory of optimal income taxation in the tradition of Mirrlees (1971).
Heterogeneity with respect to public goods preferences drives the literature on the free-
rider problem in public goods provision.
7An optimal income tax in this setting has been characterized by Weymark (1986,
1987).
8In particular, tax authorities do not distort the optimal income tax in order to mitigate
the welfare burden of the incentive constraints that are relevant for the decision on public
good provision; that is, tax authorities cannot commit not to use an optimal income
tax once the revenue requirement has been determined. However, as shown in Bierbrauer
(2005b,c), if such a commitment was possible, it would, in general, lead to welfare superior
outcomes.
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2 The Model
2.1 The Environment
The economy consists of a continuum of individuals i ∈ I := [0, 1]. Indi-
viduals differ with respect to their skill level wi, and the utility they derive
from a public good. The latter depends on a taste parameter θi that may
take two different values:
θi ∈ Θ := {θL, θH} with 0 ≤ θL < θH .
The skill parameter belongs to the compact interval
wi ∈W := [w
¯
, w¯] with 0 < w
¯
≤ w¯ .
Agent i’s utility function is given by
U i = θiQ−
ti
wi
.
Q denotes the quantity of a non-excludable public good and ti captures i’s
contribution to the cost of public good provision. Note that a lower skill
level implies a larger utility loss from a given payment obligation. The un-
derlying idea is that, for less able individuals, it is harder to generate the
income needed to meet a given payment obligation.
The function U i is the cardinal representation of preferences which is rele-
vant for welfare assessments. An individual’s ranking of alternatives can be
equivalently expressed by the monotone transformation
wiU i = θiwiQ− ti .
We refer to the product θiwi as individual i’s effective valuation of the pub-
lic good.
The parameters wi and θi are both private information of individual i and
taken to be the realizations of the stochastically independent random vari-
ables w˜i and θ˜i, respectively. The random variables {w˜i}i∈I are indepen-
dently and identically distributed (i.i.d.). Their probability distribution is
represented by a cumulative distribution function F : W → [0, 1] with den-
sity f . The random variables {θ˜i}i∈I are also i.i.d.. By p we denote the
probability that any one individual has a high taste parameter,
p := Prob{θi = θH} .
In addition, we assume that a law of large numbers (LLN) applies;9 that
is, almost surely, after the realization of randomness at the individual level,
9Postulating a LLN for a continuum of i.i.d. random variables creates a measurability
problem, as has been noted by Judd (1985) and Feldman and Gilles (1985). There is,
however, a recent literature on modeling approaches which circumvent this measurability
problem; see Alo`s-Ferrer (2002) or Al-Najjar (2004).
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the cross-section distribution of characteristics in the economy coincides
with the ex ante probability distribution that governs the randomness at
the individual level. Accordingly, the value F (w) and the probability p are
interpreted as the fractions of individuals with earning ability wi ≤ w and a
high taste parameter, respectively. The LLN also implies that the empirical
skill distribution and the empirical taste distribution are independent; that
is, on every subinterval [w′, w′′] ⊂W of the support of the skill distribution,
the share of individuals with a high taste parameter is equal to p.
We assume that the distribution F is common knowledge. Consequently, at
the aggregate level, there is no uncertainty about the skill distribution. By
contrast, the share of individuals with a high taste parameter p is taken to
be a random quantity; i.e. there is uncertainty with respect to the average
valuation of the public good.
To sum up, the information structure has a known skill distribution and
aggregate uncertainty with respect to the taste parameters. The unknown
parameter p is henceforth also referred to as the state of the economy. It is
the relevant object for the process of information aggregation.
Incentive Compatible Allocation Rules in a Continuum Economy
We limit attention to anonymous and incentive compatible allocation rules.
An anonymous allocation rule (Q, t) consists of a provision rule for the
public good and a payment scheme to cover the cost of provision.
The provision rule Q assigns to alternative values of p a quantity of the
public good,
Q : [0, 1]→ R+, p 7→ Q(p).
This provision rule is anonymous in the sense that the level of provision
Q(p) depends only on the distribution of characteristics in the economy. It
does not depend on the skill and taste parameters of specific individuals.10
The payment scheme t specifies for each individual i a payment obligation
as a function of the distribution of characteristics in the economy p and
individual i’s characteristics (θi, wi). The payment scheme is anonymous in
the sense that individuals with the same characteristics have the same pay-
ment obligation in every state p of the economy. Put differently, individual
payments do not depend on the index i. Formally the payment scheme is
described as a function
t : [0, 1] ×Θ×W → R, (p, θ, w) 7→ t(p, θ, w).
Individuals have private information on their skill and their taste parameter.
This gives rise to the following incentive compatibility constraints.
10Guesnerie (1995) calls this property anonymity in influence.
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Definition 1 An anonymous allocation rule is called incentive compatible
(IC) if ∀p ∈ [0, 1], ∀(θ,w) ∈ Θ×W , and ∀(θˆ, wˆ) ∈ Θ×W ,
θwQ(p)− t(p, θ, w) ≥ θwQ(p)− t(p, θˆ, wˆ).
These incentive constraints are to be read as follows: Suppose that a mech-
anism designer wants to implement an allocation rule (Q, t). In a revelation
game, he collects data from all individuals on their skill and on their taste
parameter. The collection of these announcements is then used for two
purposes: first, the profile of all taste announcements (θˆi)i∈I is used to de-
duce the actual value of p; second, for given p, the individual announcement
(θˆi, wˆi) is used to determine the payment obligation of individual i. The
requirement of incentive compatibility deals with this second step only. It
ensures that, for a given state p, an individual is indeed willing to make the
payment prescribed by the payment scheme t. Put differently, an individ-
ual has no reason to hide her characteristics in order to achieve a preferred
treatment by the payment scheme.
These IC constraints have to be satisfied for each possible value of p. Put
differently, whatever the “announced state of the world” which arises under
the first step, any individual is willing to reveal her characteristics; i.e we
consider implementation in dominant strategies.
As we consider a continuum economy, no single individual has a direct im-
pact on the “announced state of the world”. This is reflected in the fact
that the same level of p appears on the left hand side and the right hand
side of the IC constraint. As a consequence, no single individual has a di-
rect impact on the level of public good provision. Individuals are concerned
only with a minimization of their payment obligation. This gives rise to
the classical free-rider problem. As access to the public good is free, no one
is willing to pay more than he is forced to.11 These observations yield the
following characterization of incentive compatible allocation rules.
Lemma 1 The following statements are equivalent.
1. (Q, t) is IC.
2. (Q, t) satisfies ∀p, ∀(θ,w) and ∀(θˆ, wˆ), t(p, θ, w) = t(p, θˆ, wˆ).
Consequently, any IC payment scheme is constant in the sense that, for
given p, all individuals are treated equally. The converse statement is also
11Note that if a balanced budget has to be achieved and there are limits to coercion due
to participation constraints as in Mailath and Postlewaite (1990) or in Hellwig (2003), as
well as individuals who do not value the public good at all – i.e. with effective valuation
of 0 – one will end up with Q ≡ 0 under any admissible, incentive compatible allocation
rule.
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true; that is, any anonymous provision rule Q : p 7→ Q(p) gives rise to an IC
allocation rule if accompanied by constant payments, i.e. a payment scheme
that does only depend on p.
Budget Balance and Incentive Compatibility
The per capita cost of public good provision is given by a twice continuously
differentiable, strictly increasing and strictly convex cost function K : R+ →
R+, which satisfies K(0) = 0 as well as the boundary conditions
lim
x→0
K ′(x) = 0 and lim
x→∞
K ′(x) =∞.
The payment scheme has to be such that the costs of public good provision
are covered, i.e. such that aggregate payments are equal to the cost of provi-
sion. Combining the requirement of a balanced budget with the requirement
of IC yields the following observation.
Lemma 2 An anonymous allocation rule (Q, t) satisfies IC and a balanced
budget if and only if the payment scheme is such that
∀p ∈ [0, 1],∀(θ,w) ∈ Θ×W : t(p, θ, w) = K(Q(p)).
Lemma 2 allows us to represent an individual’s assessment of an allocation
rule (Q, t), which is budgetary feasible and incentive compatible, in the
following reduced form, which depends only on the provision rule Q,
U(p, θi, wi) := θiQ(p)−
K(Q(p))
wi
. (1)
Remark Using results from Weymark (1986, 1987), this reduced form can
also be derived from the following extended model:
i) The informational structure is as described above. Individual prefer-
ences, however, are defined over a public good Q, private goods con-
sumption C, and foregone leisure L = Y/wi, where Y denotes effective
labor supply or income. Preferences of individual i can be represented
by the following utility function
θiQ+ u(C)−
Y
wi
where u is an increasing and strictly concave function.
ii) The decisions on public good provision and taxation are made sequen-
tially. First, the level of public good provision is determined. Then,
given Q, an income tax schedule is chosen in order to maximize utili-
tarian welfare subject to incentive compatibility constraints and a tax
revenue requirement of K(Q).
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Expected utilitarian welfare
In what follows, we consider mechanism design problems of a benevolent
utilitarian planner. A budgetary-feasible and incentive-compatible alloca-
tion is evaluated from an ex ante perspective, i.e. before the actual value of
p is known. For simplicity, we impose the following assumption on the prior
of the mechanism designer.12
Assumption 1 The mechanism designer takes p to be the realization of a
random variable which is uniformly distributed on [0, 1].
Under Assumption 1 and the LLN, ex ante expected utilitarian welfare be-
comes
EW :=
1∫
0
{[
pθH + (1− p)θL
]
Q(p)−
[∫ w¯
w
¯
f(w)
w
dw
]
K(Q(p))
}
dp
= λ
1∫
0
{v¯(p)Q(p)−K(Q(p))} dp ,
where λ :=
∫
(1/w)f(w)dw is an index of the marginal welfare effects of the
cost of public good provision under equal cost sharing and
v¯(p) :=
pθH + (1− p)θL
λ
is the effective utilitarian valuation of the public good.
2.2 Information Aggregation
The problem of information aggregation is concerned with the question
whether a mechanism designer is able to learn how many individuals in
the economy have a high taste parameter. Recall that the mechanism de-
signer evaluates the profile of taste announcements (θˆi)i∈I to learn the actual
value of p. Hence, he gets to know the actual state of the world if and only
if (almost) all individuals reveal their taste parameter truthfully.
However, under an incentive-compatible and budgetary-feasible allocation
rule individuals are indifferent which taste parameter to announce; i.e. the
revelation game suffers from a problem of multiple equilibria. The reason
is that we consider only anonymous allocation mechanisms. Consequently,
no individual has a direct impact on public good provision. In addition,
incentive compatibility requires that the payment scheme treats all individ-
uals alike. These two facts imply that individuals are willing to make any
announcement in the underlying revelation game.
12Throughout we do not need to impose a common prior assumption. We only specify
the prior beliefs of the mechanism designer.
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In particular, this implies that individuals are willing to announce any taste
parameter. The problem of information aggregation, however, is resolved
only if all individuals announce their taste parameter truthfully. We will
now argue that such an obedient behavior cannot be taken for granted.
A problem with the Samuelson Rule
To illustrate this point, we discuss the provision rule Q∗ : p 7→ Q∗(p), which
is chosen by a utilitarian planner who maximizes EW pointwise; i.e. who
maximizes the expression v¯(p)Q(p) − K(Q(p)) for every p ∈ [0, 1]. This
provision ruleQ∗ is nothing but the Samuelson rule under equal cost sharing.
It is characterized by a continuum of first order conditions
∀p : v¯(p) = K ′(Q∗(p)) .
For brevity, we also refer to Q∗ as the first best provision rule. Under Q∗
individual preferences about the “announced state of the world” result from
the reduced form
U∗(p, θ, w) := θQ∗(p)−
K(Q∗(p))
w
.
It is easily verified that
U∗p (p, θ, w) =
1
w
Q∗′(p)
(
θw − v¯(p)
) 

< 0 if θw < v¯(p) ,
= 0 if θw = v¯(p) ,
> 0 if θw > v¯(p) .
Under provision rule Q∗ an individual prefers a larger level of p – or equiv-
alently a larger level of public good provision – if and only if his effective
valuation exceeds the effective utilitarian valuation. Likewise an individual
with a below average effective valuation below the average prefers to have a
lower quantity of the public good.
These observations imply that an individual would refuse to reveal his taste
parameter if he believed he had an influence on the decision on public good
provision. To see this, consider an individual with a low taste parameter and
a high skill level who has an effective valuation close to θLw¯. Moreover, for
the sake of concreteness, assume that this individual believes p to be very
low.13 If a vast majority of individuals have a low taste parameter, then
this individual can be sure that his own effective valuation lies above the
average, θLw¯ > v¯(p). Put differently, under Q
∗, the individual in question
expects that the quantity of the public good is too low. As a consequence,
the individual would be happy if the mechanism designer perceived p to be
larger. Hence, this individual is inclined to announce a high taste parameter
in order to “contribute” to a more preferred outcome.
13When this individual decides ex interim what taste parameter to announce, her prior
beliefs put a lot of probability mass on values of p which are close to zero.
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The Informative Voting Constraints
The point of these considerations is that, even though individuals have no
direct influence on public good provision, they are not indifferent about the
mechanism designer’s perception of p. That is, they are not indifferent re-
garding the outcome of the revelation game.
We now state a formal condition, called informative voting (IV), that we
impose on the mechanism design problem. It is inspired by game-theoretic
models of voting decisions in the field of political economy. For the moment,
we just introduce these conditions and provide an interpretation. However,
in Section 4 we discuss a more rigorous theoretical foundation.
In our setting IV ensures that individuals are “really” willing to reveal their
taste parameter; that is, the IV constraints guarantee that individuals are
not tempted to break the indifference among all conceivable taste announce-
ments such that they “contribute” to a more preferred perception of the state
of the economy by falsely expressing their own preferences.
Definition 2 A provision rule Q is said to satisfy the IV property if the
following holds for any w ∈ W and any p ∈ [0, 1]: U(p, θL, w) is non-
increasing in p and U(p, θH , w) is non-decreasing in p.
These monotonicity constraints are referred to as IV constraints because
of the idea that any individual subscribes to one of two groups, either to
those individuals with θi = θL or to those with θ
i = θH . Informative voting
hence is a sufficient condition which ensures that each individual supports
the group which shares her own taste parameter. As a consequence of this
behavior, the distribution of votes makes it possible to deduce the actual
value of p.
We interpret the IV constraints as a condition of robustness;14 that is,
they ensure that, whatever the prior beliefs of individuals on the likelihood
of different values of p, no individual has a reason to report a false taste
parameter in order to “contribute” to a more favorable perception of p.
Mechanism Design under IV constraints
We can now define the mechanism design problem of a utilitarian planner
who has to choose an IC allocation rule (Q, t) and, in addition, uses the
IV constraints to ensure that he can deduce the actual value of p from the
profile of taste announcements (θˆi)i∈I in the revelation game.
14Further discussion of this notion can be found in Bergemann and Morris (2005), Chung
and Ely (2004) or Kalai (2004). For mechanism design problems with private values, the
notions robustness and implementation in dominant strategies are equivalent.
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Definition 3 The following problem is called the informative voting prob-
lem (P): Choose a provision rule Q in order to maximize EW subject to the
IV constraints. The solution to this problem is denoted by Q∗∗, the induced
optimal welfare level by EW ∗∗.
In Section 4 we provide a theoretical foundation for this mechanism design
problem under IV constraints. There, we show that the optimal provision
rule Q∗∗ can be interpreted as the limit outcome of a sequence of mechanism
design problems with vanishing individual influence on public good provi-
sion. Before turning to this issue, we characterize the solution of problem
P .
3 Optimal Provision under Informative Voting
In this section we characterize the solution to the informative voting problem.
The key insight is that the extent to which the optimal provision rule Q∗∗
reflects variations in the average valuation of the public good p depends on a
specific measure of preference polarization. The role of skill heterogeneity for
preference polarization is easily demonstrated with the following alternative
characterization of the IV property.
Lemma 3 A provision rule Q satisfies IV , if and only if the following two
properties hold for any pair p, p′ ∈ [0, 1] with p′ > p:
i) Q is increasing: Q(p′) ≥ Q(p).
ii) If Q(p′) > Q(p), then
θHw
¯
≥
K(Q(p′))−K(Q(p))
Q(p′)−Q(p)
≥ θLw¯ .
A proof of the Lemma can be found in section A.3 of the Appendix. It
establishes that, with a monotonically increasing provision rule, informative
voting is ensured if and only if the following two conditions are met: an
individual with the top skill level and a low taste parameter wants the level
of public good provision to be as small as possible and an individual with
the minimal skill level but a high taste parameter wants it to be as large as
possible. Intuitively, among all individuals with a low taste parameter, the
effective valuation of the public good is highest for the individual with the
highest skill level. If even this individual wants the public good to be small,
then the same is true for every individual with a low taste parameter. A
similar reasoning applies to the set of individuals with a high taste parame-
ter. These observations allow to prove the following proposition; see section
A.3.
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Proposition 1
i) If θLw¯ > θHw
¯
, then a provision rule Q satisfies the IV property if and
only if it is constant: for all p, Q(p) = Q¯, for some Q¯ ∈ R+.
ii) The first best provision rule Q∗ satisfies the IV constraints if and only
if there is no skill heterogeneity, i.e. w
¯
= w¯.
Part i) of Proposition 1 follows immediately from Lemma 3. It establishes
that the requirement of IV may indeed heavily restrict the set of admissible
allocation rules. If θLw¯ > θHw
¯
, then a provision rule satisfies IV if and only
if information aggregation plays no role.
We refer to a parameter constellation with θLw¯ > θHw
¯
as a situation of
large within-group polarization. This terminology reflects the following con-
siderations: The IV constraints essentially require that all individuals with
the same taste parameter have the same views on public good provision.
However, individuals who have the same taste parameter differ in their ef-
fective valuations of the public good due to skill heterogeneity. We take
the distance w¯ − w
¯
to be a measure of within-group polarization. It is said
to be large if the group of individuals with low taste parameter contains
individuals whose skill level is so high that their effective valuation exceeds
the one of low skilled individuals in the high taste group.
A parameter constellation with w
¯
= w¯ is one in which there is no within-
group polarization at all. This implies that the IV constraints do not have
any bite and that the first best provision rule Q∗ is admissible. To be clear,
there are conflicting interests between groups but these conflicts are no im-
pediment for information aggregation. For any p, low taste individuals have
an effective valuation for the public good which falls short of the average ef-
fective valuation. Likewise high taste individuals have an effective valuation
which exceeds the average level. Hence, if one decides on public good provi-
sion according to the average effective valuation, one ends up in a situation
where the provision level is too low for the high taste group and too high
for the low taste group. But this is exactly the pattern of views on public
good provision which is postulated by the IV constraints.
The results in Proposition 1 characterize the optimal provision rule under
IV constraints for the extreme cases of no within-group polarization and
large within-group polarization. For the remainder of this section we con-
sider parameter constellations of moderate within-group polarization which
satisfy w
¯
6= w¯ and θLw¯ ≤ θHw
¯
. The key observation is that the second best
provision rule Q∗∗ is characterized by pooling; that is, Q∗∗ is not strictly
increasing over the whole domain [0, 1].
Proposition 2 Let w
¯
< w¯. A provision rule which solves the informative
voting problem P is either constant or has two, three or four pooling levels.
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The proof of Proposition 2 can be found in section A.1 of the appendix. The
appendix also contains a formal definition of the terminology provision rule
with two/three/four pooling levels. Here, we illustrate these provision rules
graphically; see figures 1 and 2 below.
6
-
p
0
q
1
Q∗∗
 
 
 
Figure 1: The figure depicts a provision rule with four pooling levels. Over an interme-
diate range Q∗∗ is strictly increasing and coincides with the first-best provision rule Q∗.
The graph assumes a quadratic cost function which implies that Q∗ is a linear function of
p.
6
-
p
0
q
1
Q∗∗
Figure 2: The figure depicts a provision rule with three pooling levels. A provision rule
with two pooling levels looks similar, except that the image of Q∗∗ consists only of two
elements.
The proof of Proposition 2 is based on the observation that, under IV con-
straints, the image of a provision rule contains at most one element smaller
than the most preferred provision level of an individual with effective valu-
ation θLw¯, which we denote by Q¯L, and at most one provision level larger
than the most preferred provision level of an individual with effective val-
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uation θHw
¯
, denoted by Q
¯
H .
15 Moreover, under moderate within-group
polarization, Q∗(0) is smaller than Q¯L and Q
∗(1) is larger than Q¯L. This
allows us to show that an optimal provision rule under IV constraints has
exactly one element smaller than Q¯L and exactly one element larger than
Q
¯
H . These considerations single out provision rules with four, three and
two pooling levels as candidate solutions.
Intuitively, in the light of Propositions 1 and 2, one expects that the second
best provision rule Q∗∗ looks similar to the first best provision rule Q∗ if
within-group polarization is relatively mild and becomes more similar to a
constant provision rule as within-group polarization increases. Put differ-
ently, if polarization is mild one expects the optimal provision rule to have
four pooling levels and a large interval over which Q∗∗ coincides with Q∗. If
within-group polarization becomes more pronounced one expects the opti-
mal provision rule to have two pooling levels.
We refrain from providing a general proof for these intuitive statements.
This would require an awkward exercise, distinguishing a variety of assump-
tions on the parameters θL, θH , w¯, w
¯
and λ, i.e. the skill distribution F . We
only provide an example that allows us to verify this intuition.
Example Suppose K(Q) = 12Q
2, θL = 1, θH = 3, and λ = 1. Let w
¯
= 1−x
and w¯ = 1+x. In this example x is a measure of the welfare burden imposed
by the requirement of IV. This welfare burden vanishes as x→ 0, implying
that w
¯
→ w¯. As x → 12 , one converges to the case with θLw¯ = θHw¯
which
precludes any information aggregation. One may verify that, for sufficiently
small x, a provision rule with four pooling levels is optimal. For x ≥ 2−
3
2 ,
an optimal provision rule with four pooling levels is transformed into the
degenerate case with only three pooling levels. Finally, for x close to 12 a
provision rule with only two pooling levels is superior.
4 Sampling
In section 2 we observed that in a continuum economy, the problem of in-
formation aggregation has no structure because individuals are indifferent
about which taste parameter to announce. For the definition of the informa-
tive voting problem, we just assumed that individuals break this indifference
taking their most preferred perception of the state of the economy into ac-
count. The purpose of this section is to derive the IV constraints in a way
that avoids this ad-hocery.
We discuss informative voting decisions by a finite random sample of N in-
dividuals. In a finite sample, each sample member has a strictly positive
15To see this, suppose now that here are two provision levels below Q¯L. Since preferences
in reduced form are single-peaked this individual prefers the larger of these two. But IV
rules out this possibility.
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influence on the mechanism designer’s perception of p. This structure can
be used to study the limiting case as individual influence becomes arbitrary
small. We thus regard the sampling approach to be a way to single out the
“reasonable” outcome in a continuum economy. Indeed, as we will show
below, as N → ∞, the optimal provision rule based on sampling converges
to the provision rule which solves the informative voting problem P.
The sampling procedure that we study is based on the assumption that the
cost of public good provision is shared equally among all individuals in the
economy. Put differently, we consider an incentive compatible scheme of
public goods finance that does not discriminate between individuals who
happen to be in the sample and individuals with the same characteristics
who are not sample members.
Mechanism design based on sampling
For the purpose of information aggregation, the mechanism designer com-
municates with a random sample SN of N individuals. He uses the number
m = #{i ∈ SN | θ
i = θH} of individuals with a high taste parameter to
update his prior beliefs on the actual state p of the economy. Based on
these posterior beliefs he decides on public good provision. Consequently, a
provision rule based on sampling of size N
QN : {0, 1, . . . , N} → R+, m 7→ QN (m) ,
specifies a quantity of the public good for each possible m.
A scheme of public goods finance has to satisfy incentive compatibility if
applied to the whole economy and to achieve a balanced budget. Moreover,
with respect to their payment obligations, sampled individuals must not
be treated differently than individuals who are not in the sample. As a
consequence, equal cost sharing is the only admissible payment scheme and
preferences can be represented in reduced form,
U(m, θ,w) = θQN (m)−
K(QN (m))
w
.
In a revelation game, each sampled individual has an impact on the num-
ber m of high taste parameters which are observed by the mechanism de-
signer. The following incentive conditions ensure that each sampled individ-
ual is willing to reveal her taste parameter. We call those constraints the
informative-voting-under-sampling-of-size-N (IVN ) constraints.
Definition 4 A provision rule QN allows for informative voting under sam-
pling of size N (IVN) if the following inequalities hold for allm ∈ {0, . . . , N−
1} and for all w ∈W :
θLwQN (m)−K(QN (m)) ≥ θLwQN (m+ 1)−K(QN (m+ 1)) ,
θHwQN (m)−K(QN (m)) ≤ θHwQN (m+ 1)−K(QN (m+ 1)) .
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The IVN constraints ensure that the truth is a dominant strategy in a game,
in which individuals announce either a high or a low taste parameter and
preferences are given in reduced form.
We assume that the mechanism designer chooses QN in order to maximize
utilitarian welfare from the ex ante perspective. Ex ante, the sample distri-
bution m and hence the posterior beliefs about the state of the economy are
unknown. The mechanism designer takes m to be the realization of a ran-
dom variable which behaves in accordance with the planner’s prior beliefs
and the Law of Large Numbers. As shown in the appendix, this implies that
the mechanism designer takes m to be the realization of a random variable
which is uniformly distributed over the support {0, 1, . . . , N}. Consequently,
an explicit expression for this utilitarian objective function can be derived;
see section A.3 of the Appendix.
Lemma 4 Under Assumption 1, a provision rule based on sampling of size
N , QN , gives rise to the following level of expected utilitarian welfare
EWN := λ
1
N + 1
N∑
m=0
{
v¯
(
m+ 1
N + 2
)
QN (m)−K(QN (m))
}
.
According to Lemma 4, a mechanism designer who observes a sample in
which m individuals have a high taste parameter ends up with an effective
valuation of the public good given by
v¯
(
m+ 1
N + 2
)
=
m+ 1
N + 2
θH
λ
+
N −m+ 1
N + 2
θL
λ
.
Note that this effective valuation is strictly increasing in m, and for all
m ∈ {0, . . . , N}, it exceeds v¯(0) and falls short of v¯(1).
Definition 5 The following problem is called the finite sample problem PN :
Choose a provision rule based on sampling of size N , QN in order to maxi-
mize EWN subject to the IVN constraints. The solution to this problem is
denoted by Q∗∗N , the induced optimal welfare level by EW
∗∗
N .
Large samples and the Condorcet Jury Theorem
In the following we will study the behavior of Q∗∗N and EW
∗∗
N as N → ∞.
The main result of this section establishes that as N → ∞ the informative
voting problem P and the finite sample problem PN are essentially equivalent.
Proposition 3 As N → ∞, the welfare level which is realized under a
solution of the finite sample problem PN , EW
∗∗
N , converges to the welfare
18
level which is realized under a solution of the informative voting problem P ,
EW ∗∗. Formally,
lim
N→∞
EW ∗∗N = EW
∗∗ .
Moreover, if Q∗∗ is not constant,16 then for any N ∈ N, EW ∗∗N < EW
∗∗.
A proof can be found in section A.2 of the appendix. Moreover, the ap-
pendix also contains a corollary which strengthens the equivalence between
the concepts of informative voting under sampling and informative voting
established in Proposition 3: If there is a unique solution Q∗∗ of problem P ,
then the optimal provision rule under IV constraints, Q∗∗, and the optimal
provision rule under IVN constraints Q
∗∗
N “coincide” in the limit.
As a further corollary of Proposition 3, we can prove a version of the famous
Condorcet Jury Theorem. This theorem is concerned with decision making
in committees. In its most simple version,17 the theorem says that when-
ever each committee member has some private information on the state of
the world and, moreover, all committee members have identical preferences,
then it is always preferable to have a larger committee. The underlying logic
is that a larger committee has more pieces of information available and is
thus more likely to take the “right” decision.
For our version of the Condorcet Jury Theorem we interpret the random
sample SN as a committee.
18 We then ask whether there is a finite optimal
sample size.
Corollary 1 Suppose that provision rule Q∗∗ is not constant. Then for any
given N ∈ N there exists N ′ ∈ N with N ′ > N such that EW ∗∗N < EW
∗∗
N ′ .
Whenever some degree of information aggregation is desirable, there is no
optimal sample size. The intuition for this result is the following. A grow-
ing sample size N implies that the mechanism designer’s estimate of the
actual state of the economy becomes more precise. This allows for a better
adjustment of the final provision level to the actual state of the economy.
However, a larger N also implies a larger set of IVN constraints. These
additional constraints, however, do not undermine this reasoning. A mecha-
nism designer with a large sample can always mimic a small sample outcome
by choosing not to use certain pieces of information. Hence, larger samples
generate additional degrees of freedom for the mechanism designer.
16Sufficient conditions are: θLw¯ ≤ θHw
¯
, Qˆ∗(0) ≤ Q∗(1) and Q∗(0) ≤ Q˜∗(1).
17See Austen-Smith and Banks (1996) and Piketty (1999). A more advanced treatment
can be found in Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1997).
18A similar approach can be found in Auriol and Gary-Bobo (2005).
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5 Concluding Remarks
We have addressed a problem of public goods provision in a continuum econ-
omy with uncertainty about the average valuation of the public good. We
have shown that in this environment any anonymous allocation mechanism
faces a problem of equilibrium selection, since individuals are literally indif-
ferent between all actions they have available.
We have formulated two different approaches for dealing with this problem.
The first, rather naive, idea is to use an individual’s preference over the
composition of the economy to break his indifference; i.e. whenever he is in-
different between, say, announcements a and b but would be happy if more
individuals in the economy announced b, then assume that the individual in
question will announce b as well.19
The second approach, informative voting under sampling, distinguishes more
explicitly between information aggregation to determine the optimal quan-
tity of a public good and the financing of this desired quantity. A scheme
of public goods finance that has to be incentive compatible for the whole
economy is taken as given. Under this premise, a large random sample of
individuals is used to aggregate information. Sampled individuals now have
an impact on public good provision, and this unambiguously governs their
behavior. Hence, the multiple equilibrium problem is eliminated.
Finally we have shown, that, for large random samples, these two differ-
ent approaches are equivalent. That is, the simple rule which we refer to
as informative voting can be interpreted as the limit outcome of vanishing
individual influence under a voting mechanism with a finite number of indi-
viduals.
A third approach that also provides a foundation of the informative voting
constraints can be found in Bierbrauer (2005a). In this paper an admissible
provision rule for public goods has to satisfy a condition of collective incen-
tive compatibility, which eliminates incentives for collective manipulations
of the perceived state of the economy. For the quasi-linear environment an-
alyzed in the present paper, this requirement is shown to be equivalent to
the informative voting constraints.
19In models with voting over two alternatives and a continuum of voters one often finds
the statement that this behavior is the only one which survives the elimination of weakly
dominated strategies. Implicitly, this reasoning appeals to a large but finite economy.
Examples include Gersbach (2005) or Meirowitz (2005).
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A Appendix
A.1 Proof of Proposition 2
Before turning to the proof of the proposition we state the formal definition
of a provision rule with two, three and four mass points, respectively.
We first need to introduce the following piece of notation. For a provision
level Q with Q < Q¯L, denote by Qˆ the provision level which satisfies Q < Qˆ
and θLw¯Q − K(Q) = θLw¯Qˆ − K(Qˆ); that is, an individual with effective
valuation θLw¯ is indifferent between the provision levels Q and Qˆ. Likewise,
for any Q with Q
¯
H < Q, denote by Q˜ the provision level with Q˜ < Q and
θHw
¯
Q−K(Q) = θHw
¯
Q˜−K(Q˜).
Definition 6 An increasing provision rule Q4 : p 7→ Q4(p) is said to have
four pooling levels if
Q4(p) :=


Qs4 for 0 ≤ p ≤ pˆ ,
Qˆs4 for pˆ < p < pˆ
′ ,
Q∗(p) for pˆ′ ≤ p ≤ p˜′ ,
Q˜l4 for p˜
′ < p < p˜ ,
Ql4 for p˜ ≤ p ≤ 1 ,
where the critical indices are implicitly defined by the following equations:20
v¯(pˆ) = θLw¯ , Q
∗(pˆ′) = Qˆs4 , Q
∗(p˜′) = Q˜l4 , v¯(p˜) = θHw¯
.
6
-
θLw¯Q−K(Q)
θHw
¯
Q−K(Q)
r
Q∗(0)
r
Q∗(1)
r
Q¯L
r
Q
¯
H
r
Q˜l4
r
Qˆs4
r
Ql4
r
Qs4
Figure 3: The figure depicts a provision rule characterized by four pooling levels.
20This definition already presumes an optimal choice of the critical indices: a utilitarian
planner will choose, e.g. , pˆ according to the following criterion: Let Q(p) = Qs4 if and
only if v¯(p)Qs4 −K(Q
s
4) exceeds v¯(p)Qˆ
s
4 −K(Qˆ
s
4). Given the binding IV constraint which
links Qs4 and Qˆ
s
4, this is equivalent to Q(p) = Q
s
4 if and only if v¯(p) ≤ θLw¯.
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If the range where the provision rules Q4 and Q
∗ coincide shrinks to a
singleton one has a provision rule characterized by three pooling levels.
Definition 7 An increasing provision rule Q3 : p 7→ Q3(p) is said to have
three pooling levels if
Q3(p) :=


Qs3 for 0 ≤ p ≤ pˆ ,
Qm3 for pˆ < p < p˜ ,
Ql3 for p˜ ≤ p ≤ 1 ,
where the critical indices pˆ and p˜ are defined implicitly by the equations
v¯(pˆ) = θLw¯ and v¯(p˜) = θHw
¯
.
The medium sized provision level Qm3 is now linked via a binding IV con-
straint withQs3 and via a binding IV constraint withQ
l
3, i.e. Q
m
3 = Qˆ
s
3 = Q˜
l
3.
If the medium range shrinks further, there is no provision level lying between
Q¯L and Q
¯H
. Such a provision rule is characterized by two pooling levels .
Definition 8 An increasing provision rule Q2 : p 7→ Q2(p) is said to have
two pooling levels if
Q2(p) :=
{
Qs2 for 0 ≤ p ≤ pˆ ,
Ql2 for pˆ < p ≤ 1 ,
where the critical index pˆ is defined implicitly by the equation
v¯(pˆ)Qs2 −K(Q
s
2) = v¯(pˆ)Q
l
2 −K(Q
l
2) .
Proof of Proposition 2. The required arguments are lengthy but not
difficult. Hence the arguments are only sketched. As has been shown in
Proposition 1, there are parameter constellations such that Q∗∗ is indeed
constant. Now suppose that Q∗∗ is not constant. Thus, by Proposition 1,
θLw¯ ≤ θHw
¯
and hence Q∗(0) ≤ Q¯L ≤ Q
¯H
≤ Q∗(1). We show within the
next three steps that Q∗∗ is a provision rule with either two, three or four
pooling levels.
Step 1. Denote by VQ the image of a provision rule Q, i.e. x ∈ VQ if and
only if there exists p ∈ [0, 1] with Q(p) = x. Under the IV constraints, there
exists at most one element x ∈ VQ with x < Q¯L.
Proof of step 1. To see this, suppose, to the contrary, that there exist
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x, y ∈ VQ with x < y < Q¯L. Under IV, as characterized in Lemma 3, this
implies that there exist p and p′ > p, with Q(p) < Q(p′) < Q¯L. This yields
θLw¯Q(p)−K(Q(p)) < θLw¯Q(p
′)−K(Q(p′)) ,
a contradiction to the IV requirement for an individual with effective valua-
tion θLw¯. Analogously one shows that the image of an admissible provision
rule contains at most one element x with x > Q
¯H
.
Step 2. We now show that a provision rule Q for which there exists y ∈ VQ
with y ∈ [Q¯L, Q
¯H
] is a candidate for a solution only if there exist x, z ∈ VQ
with x < Q¯L and Q
¯H
< z.
Proof of step 2. To this end, we first argue that a provision rule Q for which
there exist neither x ∈ VQ with x < Q¯L nor z ∈ VQ with z > Q
¯H
cannot be
optimal. Such a hypothetical provision rule would satisfy VQ ⊂ [Q¯L, Q
¯H
].
This can be optimal only if VQ = [Q¯L, Q
¯H
], which would be the degenerate
case of a provision rule with four pooling levels, which results as the limit
outcome as Qs4 converges to Q¯L and Q
l
4 converges to Q
¯H
. Under a provision
rule characterized by four pooling levels, expected welfare EW satisfies the
following equation:
EW
λ
= pˆ
[
v¯
(
pˆ
2
)
Qs
4
−K(Qs
4
)
]
+ (pˆ′ − pˆ)
[
v¯
(
pˆ′ + pˆ
2
)
Qˆs
4
−K(Qˆs
4
)
]
+
p˜′∫
pˆ′
{¯
v(p)Q∗(p)−K(Q∗(p))
}
dp+ (p˜−p˜′)
[
v¯
(
p˜′ + p˜
2
)
Q˜l4−K(Q˜
l
4)
]
+(1− p˜)
[
v¯
(
1 + p˜
2
)
Ql4 −K(Q
l
4)
]
,
where Qˆs4 and pˆ
′ are implicit functions of Qs4. Similarly, Q˜
l
4 and p˜
′ are
implicit functions of Ql4. Taking these functional relationships into account,
one may compute the partial derivatives and verify that
lim
Qs
4
→Q¯L
∂EW (Qs4, Q
l
4)
∂Qs
4
< 0 and lim
Ql
4
→Q
H
∂EW (Qs4, Q
l
4)
∂Ql
4
> 0.
Thus, Qs4 = Q¯L and Q
l
4 = Q
¯H
cannot be optimal.
We now argue in a similar manner that it cannot be optimal to choose a
provision rule with y, z ∈ VQ satisfying Q¯L < y < Q
¯H
< z, but without
x ∈ VQ satisfying x < Q¯L:
Define z˜ < Q
¯H
by the equation θHw
¯
z−K(z) = θHw
¯
z˜−K(z˜). Note that for
such a provision rule to be a optimal under IV it has to be true that y ≤ z˜
and that VQ = [Q¯L, z˜] ∪ {z} by step 1 and the requirement of optimality.
Again, this is a degenerate case of a provision rule with four pooling levels ,
namely the one that results as Qs4 converges to Q¯L and Q
l
4 = z. As above,
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this hypothetical solution can be ruled out as
lim
Qs
4
→Q¯L
∂EW (Qs4, Q
l
4)
∂Qs
4
< 0 .
The analogous argument allows us to rule out a provision rule with x, y ∈ VQ
and x < Q¯L < y < Q
¯H
but without z ∈ VQ satisfying z > Q
¯H
.
Step 3. We now claim that a provision rule, for which there exist x, y ∈ VQ
with Q¯L < x < y < Q
¯H
, is a candidate for a solution only if the whole
interval satisfies [x, y] ⊂ VQ.
Proof of Step 3. By step 2, there are a, b ∈ VQ with a < Q¯L < Q
¯H
< b.
Define b˜ < Q
¯H
by the equation θHw
¯
b−K(b) = θHw
¯
b˜−K(b˜). Analogously,
define aˆ > Q¯L by θLw¯ a − K(a) = θLw¯ aˆ − K(aˆ). For the hypothesized
provision rule to be a optimal under IV , it has to be true that aˆ ≤ x < y ≤ b˜
and that [x, y] ⊂ [aˆ, b˜] ⊂ VQ.
Steps 1-3 imply that an optimal provision rule under IV , which is not
constant, has to be one with two, three or four pooling levels.
A.2 Proof of Proposition 3
We start with the observation that the maximal welfare level EW ∗∗, which
is achievable under IV constraints, is, for any sample size N , an upper
bound for the expected welfare that is achievable under IVN constraints. To
establish this claim, we define, for any given N ∈ N, the following piecewise
constant continuation of the solution of problem PN , which we denote by
Q˜∗∗N :
Q˜∗∗N : [0, 1] → {Q
∗∗
N (m)}
N
m=0, with
Q˜∗∗N (p) := Q
∗∗
N (m) for
m
N + 1
≤ p <
m+ 1
N + 1
, (2)
Q˜∗∗N (1) := Q
∗∗
N (N).
The welfare level induced by Q˜∗∗N is denoted E˜W
∗∗
N .
Lemma 5 For any N ∈ N, the following inequalities hold:
EW ∗∗N ≤ E˜W
∗∗
N ≤ EW
∗∗ .
The first inequality is strict if and only if Q∗∗N is not constant.
Proof of Lemma 5. We note that the requirement of IVN can be char-
acterized analogous to the characterization of the IV property in Lemma
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3. Accordingly, a provision rule based on sampling QN satisfies IVN if and
only if the following two properties hold for any pair m,m′ ∈ {0, 1, . . . , N}
with m′ > m:
i) QN is increasing: QN (m
′) ≥ QN (m).
ii) If QN (m
′) > QN (m), then
θHw
¯
≥
K(QN (m
′))−K(QN (m))
QN(m′)−QN(m)
≥ θLw¯ .
By definition, Q˜∗∗N is monotonically increasing in p and inherits the IV
property from the fact that {Q∗∗N (m)}
N
m=0 is IVN . This is obvious from
the above characterization of IVN and Lemma 3. Hence, by the optimality
of Q∗∗ among the provision rules satisfying IV, E˜W
∗∗
N ≤ EW
∗∗. It thus
remains to be shown that EW ∗∗N ≤ E˜W
∗∗
N .
In order to compute E˜W
∗∗
N , we first collect a number of observations which
are easily verified by the reader.
1. For all p
¯
, p¯ ∈ [0, 1]
∫ p¯
p
¯
v¯(p)dp = (p¯− p
¯
)v¯
(
p¯+ p
¯
2
)
.
2. For all m ∈ {0, 1, . . . , N}
m+ 1
2
N + 1
=
m+ 1
N + 2
+
m− 1
2
N
(N + 1)(N + 2)
.
3. For all x, y ∈ [0, 1] with x+ y ∈ [0, 1], v¯(x+ y) = v¯(x) + θH−θL
λ
y.
4. By definition of EW ∗∗N and Q
∗∗
N ,
EW ∗∗N = λ
1
N + 1
N∑
m=0
{
v¯
(
m+ 1
N + 2
)
Q∗∗N (m)−K(Q
∗∗
N (m))
}
.
Using these equalities, one arrives at
E˜W
∗∗
N = λ
1∫
0
{
v¯(p)Q˜∗∗N (p)−K(Q˜
∗∗
N (p))
}
dp
= EW ∗∗N +
θH − θL
(N + 1)2(N + 2)
N∑
m=0
(m−
1
2
N)Q∗∗N (m) .
To complete the proof, we show that
N∑
m=0
(m −
1
2
N)Q∗∗N (m) ≥ 0. This ex-
pression equals
∑ 1
2
N
m=0(
1
2
N −m)(Q∗∗N (N −m)−Q
∗∗
N (m))
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if N is even and
∑N−1
2
m=0(
1
2
N −m)(Q∗∗N (N −m)−Q
∗∗
N (m))
if N is odd. However, as Q∗∗N is increasing, those sums are non-negative.
Moreover, they are strictly positive, and hence EW ∗∗N <
˜EW
∗∗
N if and only
if Q∗∗N is not constant.
Proof of the first statement of Proposition 3. We now establish that
EW ∗∗N converges to EW
∗∗ as N goes to ∞.
Let Q∗∗ be a solution of problem P and Q∗∗|N its restriction to the domain
{0, 1, . . . , N}. Formally, for each m ∈ {0, 1, . . . , N}, Q∗∗|N(m) is defined by
the equation Q∗∗|N (m) := Q
∗∗
(
m
N
)
. One easily verifies that Q∗∗|N has the IVN
property.
Denote by EW ∗∗|N the expected welfare level induced by Q
∗∗
|N . Then, since Q
∗∗
N
is optimal among the provision rules with the IVN property, EW
∗∗
|N ≤ EW
∗∗
N .
Moreover,
EW ∗∗|N = λ
1
N + 1
N∑
m=0
{
v¯
(
m+ 1
N + 2
)
Q∗∗
(
m
N
)
−K(Q∗∗
(
m
N
)
)
}
= λ
1
N + 1
N∑
m=0
{
v¯
(
m
N
)
Q∗∗
(
m
N
)
−K(Q∗∗
(
m
N
)
)
}
+
θH − θL
N(N + 1)(N + 2)
N∑
m=0
(N − 2m)Q∗∗
(
m
N
)
.
The first term in this sum is known as the Riemann sum21 for v¯(p)Q∗∗(p)−
K(Q∗∗(p) and thus converges to EW ∗∗ for growing N . The second term
in the sum is bounded from above by the expression θH−θL
N+2 Q
∗∗(1), which
vanishes as N →∞. Consequently,
lim
N→∞
EW ∗∗|N = EW
∗∗ .
Summing up and using Lemma 5, we have
EW ∗∗ = lim
N→∞
EW ∗∗|N ≤ limN→∞
EW ∗∗N ≤ EW
∗∗ .
21See e.g. Heuser (1998, Ch.10).
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Proof of the second statement of Proposition 3. We now show that
EW ∗∗N is strictly smaller than EW
∗∗ for any N provided that Q∗∗ is not a
constant provision rule.
Denote by EW u the maximal level of expected welfare which can be gener-
ated by some constant provision rule. If the solution to problem P is not
constant, then EW u < EW ∗∗. If, for N ∈ N, a solution to problem PN is
constant, then EW ∗∗N = EW
u < EW ∗∗. If, by contrast, Q∗∗N is not constant,
then EW ∗∗N < EW
∗∗ by Lemma 5.
We finally establish the following corollary of Proposition 3.
Corollary 2 Suppose there is a unique solution Q∗∗ to problem P , and let
Q˜∗∗N be defined as in (2). Then, for all p ∈ [0, 1]
lim
N→∞
Q˜∗∗N (p) = Q
∗∗(p) .
Proof of Corollary 2. By Lemma 5 and Proposition 3,
lim
N→∞
EW ∗∗N = lim
N→∞
E˜W
∗∗
N = EW
∗∗ .
Q˜∗∗N is IVN for all N ∈ N. Thus, the uniqueness of Q
∗∗ among the provision
rules which satisfy IV and yield welfare level EW ∗∗ implies the claimed
property of pointwise convergence.
A.3 Further Proofs
Proof of Lemma 3. We first show that the IV constraints imply state-
ments i) and ii). The IV constraints imply that the following two inequalities
have to hold,
θLwQ(p)−K(Q(p)) ≥ θLwQ(p
′)−K(Q(p′)) ,
θHwQ(p)−K(Q(p)) ≤ θHwQ(p
′)−K(Q(p′)) .
Adding up these inequalities yields:
(θH − θL)w[Q(p
′)−Q(p)] ≥ 0 .
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This establishes i). Now suppose that Q(p) < Q(p′). Then for any w ∈ W ,
IV requires that
K(Q(p′))−K(Q(p))
Q(p′)−Q(p)
≥ θLw .
This property holds for all w ∈W if and only if it holds for the largest skill
level w¯,
K(Q(p′))−K(Q(p))
Q(p′)−Q(p)
≥ θLw¯ .
Likewise we derive the requirement
θHw
¯
≥
K(Q(p′))−K(Q(p))
Q(p′)−Q(p)
.
This establishes ii).
The proof that i) and ii) imply that the IV property holds is now immediate.
Proof of Proposition 1. Statement i) is a direct consequence of Lemma
3. It thus remains to be shown that Q∗ satisfies IV if and only if w
¯
= w¯.
To prove the “only if” part, suppose that w
¯
6= w¯. Consider the indirect
utility function U∗(p, θ, w). As shown in the body of the text, U∗ is increas-
ing in p as long as θw > v¯(p), i.e. the individual’s effective valuation of the
public good exceeds the effective utilitarian valuation. Analogously, U∗ is
decreasing in p if θw falls short of the utilitarian valuation. Now consider a
level of p such that22
θLw¯ > v¯(p) >
θL
λ
.
This implies that there exists a critical value wˆ ∈]w
¯
, w¯[ such that all indi-
viduals with θi = θL and w
i > wˆ have an effective valuation θLw
i exceeding
v¯(p). Therefore, they would prefer a slightly larger perceived value of p.
This violates the IV property.
To prove the “if” part, suppose that w
¯
= w¯ =: w˜. As Q∗ is a strictly in-
creasing function, Lemma 3 states that Q∗ satisfies IV if and only if p′ > p
implies that
θHw˜ ≥
K(Q∗(p′))−K(Q∗(p))
Q∗(p′)−Q∗(p)
≥ θLw˜ .
22As v¯(p) is a convex combination of θH
λ
and θL
λ
, for any x ∈ [ θL
λ
,
θH
λ
] there exists p
such that v¯(p) = x.
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We show in the following that the convexity of K and the first order condi-
tions characterizing Q∗ imply that these inequalities are indeed satisfied for
any pair p′ and p with p′ > p. From the convexity of the cost function, we
have
K ′(Q∗(p′)) >
K(Q∗(p′))−K(Q∗(p))
Q∗(p′)−Q∗(p)
> K ′(Q∗(p)) .
With w
¯
= w¯ =: w˜, the first order conditions characterizing Q∗ imply
K ′(Q∗(p)) = v¯(p) = w˜(pθH + (1− p)θL) ≥ w˜θL ,
K ′(Q∗(p′)) = v¯(p′) = w˜(p′θH + (1− p
′)θL) ≤ w˜θH .
Proof of Lemma 4.
Step 1. We first derive the posterior beliefs of the mechanism designer.
The mechanism designer’s prior beliefs are given by the density function φ.
Under Assumption 1, φ(p) = 1 for all p ∈ [0, 1]. Let ν be the number of
agents with a high taste parameter in a sample of size N . Again, from an
ex ante perspective, ν is a random variable, with23
pr(ν = m) =
1∫
0
pr(ν = m | p)φ(p)dp
=
1∫
0
(
N
m
)
pm(1− p)N−mdp =
1
N + 1
.
(3)
This is intuitive, with p uniformly distributed, all possible realizations of ν
are equally likely. Now suppose that ν = m and consider the conditional
density φN thereby induced over p. By Bayes’ rule
φN (p | ν = m) =
pr(ν = m | p)φ(p)
pr(ν = m)
= (N + 1)
(
N
m
)
pm(1− p)N−m .
23The following relation is used repeatedly:
1
R
0
pm(1− p)N−mdp =
m!(N −m)!
(N + 1)!
.
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Step 2. Expected welfare at the interim stage is hence given by
EW intN (m) = λE[v¯(p)QN (m)−K(QN(m)) | m]
= λ
1∫
0
[v¯(p)QN (m)−K(QN (m))]φ(p | ν = m)dp
= λ(N + 1)
(
N
m
)( 1∫
0
[
pθH + (1− p)θL
λ
QN(m)−K(QN(m))
]
×
pm(1 − p)N−m dp
)
= λ
[
m+ 1
N + 2
θH
λ
+
N −m+ 1
N + 2
θL
λ
]
QN (m)−K(QN(m)).
Step 3. From the ex-ante perspective, the outcome m of the sampling pro-
cedure is the realization of a random variable, which we denote by ν. Taking
expectations over m, using (3), expected welfare from the ex-ante perspec-
tive equals
EWN =
N∑
m=0
EW int(m)pr(ν = m)
= λ
1
N + 1
N∑
m=0
{
v¯
(
m+ 1
N + 2
)
QN (m)−K(QN (m))
}
.
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